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These past few years, the European 
Union (EU) has taken various decisions 
which, when taken together, amount to a 
careful repositioning in international 
politics. Let us be bold and call it the 
inkling of a Grand Strategy: an idea of the 
Union’s shifting place in the great power 
relations that determine international 
politics. Yet that nascent Grand Strategy 
is not equally shared by all EU Member 
States or even by all EU institutions, nor 
has it yet been incorporated into all 
relevant strands of EU policy. If the 
implications are not fully thought 
through and the repositioning stops here, 
the EU as well as the Member States risk 
ending up in a permanently ambivalent 
position: more than a satellite of the US, 
but not a really independent power either. 
Such a half-hearted stance would alienate 
their allies and partners while tempting 
their adversaries. For now, the EU has 
done enough to irritate the US but not to 
obtain the benefits sought: to further the 
European interest and to play a 
stabilising role in great power relations. 
Will 2020 see the EU and the Member 
States muster the courage to fully 
implement the choices that they have 
already started to make? 
 
Many in the EU still feel that no repositioning is 
necessary, that it suffices to align with the US to 
defend the European interest. Look, they say, if 
even under Trump the number of American 
troops in Europe has increased, then surely that 
proves that the US will always have the 
European interest at heart?  
In reality, the US has the American interest at 
heart, and rightly so. Nobody is arguing though 
that the US is about to abandon Europe. As a 
global power the US has global interests, 
including a stable and prosperous Europe. The 
crucial point is that America’s order of priority 
has changed. During the Cold War, it was always 
clear that Berlin had priority over Saigon. And 
indeed, while one is now Ho Chi Minh City, the 
other did not become Khrushchevstadt. Today, 
however, nearly the entire US strategic 
community sees one overriding priority: the 
rivalry with China, which is mainly playing out in 
Asia. The Europeans are seen less as allies 
worthy of protection than as free-riders. Not 
only do they not spend enough on their own 
defence; they are even cosying up to America’s 
adversaries. The Trump administration is 
cajoling Europeans into falling in line behind the 
US and adopting a harder stance against China, 
Iran, and Russia.  
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A next US administration may be more willing 
to convince the Europeans rather than to coerce 
them through economic sanctions, and to 
reform rather than to block key multilateral 
institutions such as the WTO. It might even 
adopt a less one-sidedly pro-Saudi strategy in the 
Middle East. But whoever wins the White 
House in November of this year: China will be 
seen as the adversary to be contained or reduced 
in power; there will be a more transactional 
approach to multilateralism, including NATO; 
Europe will continue to be seen in a more 
instrumental way, as a source of allies to be 
mobilised against America’s adversaries; and the 
EU’s economic and energy interests as such will 
never be a priority for the US. Nor will they be 
for China or Russia, obviously.  
This is not a plea therefore for the EU to take 
its distance from the US. Since most EU 
Member States have an alliance with the US, 
weakening the Transatlantic link would be rather 
daft. But Europe’s strategic outlook does call for 
a repositioning in order to ensure that whatever 
strategy its American ally and the other great 
powers adopt, the EU and its Member States 
always have enough freedom of action to defend 
the European interest. 
EUROPEAN CHOICES AND THE GREAT POWERS                                                                             
What has the EU done so far? In March 2019 
Brussels announced that it sees China as a 
strategic partner, an economic competitor and a 
systemic rival, all at the same time. This is about 
Grand Strategy, and the players concerned took 
due notice.  
Beijing correctly understood this as heralding a 
more transactional EU approach. No longer is 
the EU just saying to China: wouldn’t it be nice 
if you would open your market to us as we open 
ours to you? The new message is: it would only 
be fair, and if you don’t, we will have to limit 
your access. Instead, let us achieve Positive 
Reciprocity, therefore, by increasing openness 
and transparency on both sides. Washington 
also took note, because this was a message for 
the US as well: the EU and the US are and will 
remain strategic partners (and, for most EU 
Member States, formal allies), but that does not 
mean that the other powers are Europe’s 
adversaries, even if the US treats them as such. 
How the EU deals with other powers will 
depend on Brussels’ assessment of their 
behaviour towards Europe, not just on 
Washington.  
 
The advantage of this repositioning is that it 
enables the EU to better defend its own 
interests while playing a stabilising role in great 
power relations. In order to reap these benefits, 
the EU must now make sure to incorporate its 
new position into all of its policies and actions.  
 
The approach to China can be summarised as: 
Cooperate When You Can, But Push Back 
When You Must. Both parties willing, 
cooperation is easy. We will know later this year 
whether that is the case: will the EU and China 
conclude a Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
as announced at last year’s EU-China Summit? 
Pushing back is more difficult, not only because 
there always seems to be a least one EU 
Member State that blocks consensus, but also 
because over the years the EU has developed a 
culture that is quite the opposite of Realpolitik. 
But pushing back is vital in order to signal to 
China that any more aggressive use of its power 
will not work, as well as to uphold the EU 
stance on human rights. If in practice the EU 
ends up cooperating with China without 
pushing back, that will encourage the Chinese 
assertiveness that EU engagement precisely 
seeks to avoid.  
 
The EU does not seek an equidistant position 
between the US and China: the default position 
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is to work with the US to defend the European 
interest. But if EU and US interests on a specific 
issue diverge, the EU should be able to work 
with other powers. Allies must be able to agree 
to disagree sometimes, rather than use sanctions 
to force each other into line. Or should the EU 
have slapped sanctions on the US for violating 
the Iran nuclear deal? But the EU has yet to find 
an effective way to shield European companies 
from American extraterritorial legislation – the 
INSTEX mechanism created to shield firms 
doing business with Iran doesn’t work. As a 
result, the EU does not actually possess the 
complete freedom to deal with other powers 
and to address crises as it sees fit. This leads to 
tensions with the US, yet all the while many 
other powers continue to see Europe as not 
much more than a US satellite.  
  
Relations with Russia might be the next case in 
point. The EU has held firm on sanctions, but 
disagreement is growing about the right mix of 
deterrence and détente. Germany’s Nordstream 
2 project, for example, is heavily contested even 
among Europeans; whatever the merits of the 
case, with the US this should be the subject of a 
dialogue, not of sanctions. President Macron’s 
call for a new opening towards Russia has 
proved even more disruptive. The point of the 
sanctions is, of course, to induce Russia into 
changing its behaviour and enable good-
neighbourly relations. Even many Russian 
scholars argue that as China gains ever more 
influence in Russia’s near abroad, Moscow 
would do wise to normalise relations with the 
EU. Whether the time is at all ripe for a new 
initiative now, is another question. This must be 
a collective EU decision: in view of the security 
concerns of the Central and Eastern European 
EU Member States, there can be no space here 
for unilateral initiatives. If Europeans agree on a 
new approach towards their neighbour, that 
would again call for an in-depth strategic 
dialogue with the US – not for US coercion.  
CHOICES AND INSTRUMENTS 
Another important EU decision has been the 
adoption of the EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy 
(September 2018) and the creation of a 
connectivity partnership with Japan (September 
2019). Like all good strategies, the basic idea is 
simple: if the EU feels that China, through its 
Belt and Road Initiative (or in some places 
Russia, through the Eurasian Economic Union), 
is gaining too much influence in a country where 
the European interest is at stake, Europe has to 
put a better offer on the table. Thus the EU seeks 
to create Connectivity by Consent, convincing 
states that it is in their interest to create a level 
and transparent economic playing field and 
engage with various powers simultaneously rather 
than putting all their eggs in a Chinese or Russian 
basket. But to mobilise sufficient public and 
private means and generate viable investment 
projects to be convincing enough, will be a huge 
challenge. The partnership with Japan will 
certainly help the EU to achieve the scale 
required. Expectations have been raised, and the 
EU effort is real – but real strategic impact will 
not be easy to achieve.  
 
Perhaps the most visible recent EU decision has 
been the activation of Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) (December 2017). So far, 
Member States have focused almost exclusively 
on PESCO as a forum for cooperative capability 
projects. Designing, building, and procuring 
equipment together will certainly improve the 
way Europeans spend their defence budgets. But 
the current 47 PESCO projects are far from a 
coherent whole: too many are just ideas rather 
than real projects with budgets attached, and 
even the real projects mostly do not address the 
well-known priority shortfalls in the European 
militaries. Member States seem to have lost sight 
of the original purpose of PESCO: to create a 
coherent full-spectrum force package. More than 
just joint procurement or even improved 
interoperability, that will require effective integration 
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of forces. As it is, PESCO and the European 
Defence Fund (EDF) have gone far enough to 
strain relations with the US (because of 
Washington’s rather hypocritical anger over the 
EU’s aim to promote European defence 
industry), but not far enough by far to guarantee 
the quantum leap that European defence so 
urgently needs.  
 
The EU has also taken important steps in 
securing its home base, notably the launch of an 
investment screening mechanism (April 2019). 
Understood mostly as a reaction to China, 
investment screening should apply to all non-EU 
actors, and has to be seen in the context of 
overall industrial policy, which is itself being 
adapted to the changing global balance of power. 
For now, investment screening remains basically 
voluntary. For it to become really effective, it will 
gradually have to become more binding, and can 
then also be imposed upon all candidates for EU 
membership.  
 
ABSENT CHOICES  
Unfortunately, there also key areas for which the 
EU has omitted to make strategic choices, 
notably for its southern periphery. The EU and 
its Member States have been firmly committed 
to the Iran nuclear deal, to the defeat of IS, and 
to the unity of Libya. They never developed a 
view, however, on how to address the regional 
geopolitical competition between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia and the various proxy wars that they are 
fighting; yet if the US withdrew from the 
JCPOA, it was because it seeks to counter Iran’s 
regional ambitions. Nor did the Europeans 
generate a position on the political future of 
Syria and which groups to support on which 
territories, so it was unforgivably taken by 
surprise when the US withdrew its military 
presence from Kurdish-held northern Syria. And 
if EU support for the UN-recognized 
Government of National Accord in Tripoli was 
clear, there was no concrete plan to help it 
achieve control of Libya (while France in effect 
began to support the other main force in the 
country, General Haftar). Without clear strategic 
goals a proactive role is impossible. The EU was 
thus forever reacting to events.  
 
Too many practitioners still believe that strategy 
is superfluous and, at most, rationalises policy ex 
post factum. Europe’s failure to have any 
meaningful impact on developments in its 
southern periphery that directly affected its 
security prove that without a sense of strategic 
objectives, one cannot generate sufficient 
influence to steer events. Blaming the new EU 
leadership for this situation, and ridiculing it 
even (by contrasting the reality with Commission 
President von der Leyen’s ambition for a 
“geopolitical Commission”), is a bit too easy 
when Brussels and the national capitals ought to 
have set the strategy years ago. It is now up to 
the new team though to do better and develop a 
strategic view. The Berlin conference on Libya 
(19 January 2020) proves that the EU still has 
convening power. This diplomatic clout has to 
be underpinned by the military readiness and the 
political will to project force if and when 
necessary. The success of PESCO is directly 
linked to the success of EU diplomacy.  
 
CONCLUSION: AVOIDING BLOCS   
The EU has initiated a real strategic reorientation, 
positioning itself in the great power game and 
equipping itself with a connectivity strategy, a military 
power projection capacity, and an investment 
screening mechanism. If the EU sees this through to 
the end, it will carve out the freedom of action that 
will allow it to always defend its political, economic 
and security interests while playing a stabilising role in 
great power relations. The worst that could happen 
would be for world politics to be frozen again into 
permanent antagonism between two blocs: Europe 
and the US versus Russia and China. The nascent EU 
Grand Strategy can also be understood as the EU 
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giving itself the Power to Engage the other global 
actors, on its own terms, to prevent exactly that.  
 
The EU must, however, absolutely avoid the 
emergence of competing “blocs” within the Union 
itself, which would render an effective global role 
impossible. Many Central and Eastern European 
Member States ultimately trust only the American 
security guarantee, and view all EU defence initiatives 
(and all openings towards Russia) with suspicion, 
while others, with France in the lead, advocate 
“strategic autonomy” in defence. The current US 
administration purposely deepens this divide by its 
constant démarches that put PESCO and the EDF in 
a negative light in various European capitals. China 
has been very successful in dividing the EU, with 
many Eastern and Southern European Member 
States adopting a more liberal view to China’s role in 
their economies, which Beijing eagerly highlights 
through prominent bilateral visits. France, Germany, 
the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries on the 
contrary have become more careful and are at the 
origin of the investment screening initiative.  
 
Interestingly, the countries who put the most faith in 
NATO and the American security guarantee are least 
in line with the US’ more confrontational China 
policy. They will seek to maintain their freedom of 
action in this regard, though when push comes to 
shove national security will likely take priority over the 
perceived benefits of deeper ties with China. At the 
same time, those who have become somewhat more 
sceptical of China constitute the economic centre of 
gravity of the EU, which if they stick together will act 
as an effective barrier to how much influence China 
can hope to gain. That group is insufficiently united 
on defence policy, however, for PESCO to have 
already achieved the stage in which it will clearly lead 
to a quantum leap. Even the Member States that 
purport to be most in favour have yet to demonstrate 
their willingness to really go for defence integration 
this time.  
 
More importantly, objectively the different positions 
are not that far apart. Nobody is now seeking 
autonomy in terms of collective territorial defence; the 
argument is rather that making full use of PESCO and 
the EDF is the best way for the EU Member States 
that are NATO allies and partners to significantly 
increase their contribution to the Alliance. It is indeed 
remarkable that there is an implicit consensus that the 
point of PESCO is not just to generate the capabilities 
that would be required for the type of CSDP 
operations that we have seen until now (i.e. mostly 
smaller scale and lower intensity), but to address 
participating Member States’ armed forces in their 
entirety and help them meet their NATO targets as 
well. Not so long ago, this would have been politically 
impossible. Similarly, nobody is seeking to decouple 
the European economy from China; the argument is 
only that in specific sectors care should be taken to 
protect Europe’s sovereignty, and that one should not 
play into China’s designs by giving more political 
visibility to Chinese investment projects than their 
(actually relatively limited) share in overall investment 
warrants.  
 
A strategic consensus appears possible, therefore, but 
only if certain Member States refrain from using their 
capacity to block foreign policy decisions (which 
require unanimity) as a tool in their dispute with the 
EU institutions over democracy and the rule of law. 
This is a dispute about what the EU is, which is why 
the EU cannot give in: the whole point of the Union 
is to protect the way of life that Europeans have 
founded on democracy, the rule of law, and equality. 
Meanwhile, it is about time that everybody realises that 
the EU already is a single economic bloc: one market 
with, for most Member States, one currency and one 
external border. If the border of that bloc is breached, 
anywhere, ipso facto every Member State’s national 
security is breached. In a world of continent-sized 
great powers, unless the EU acts as an economic, 
political and security bloc, it will lose.  
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